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elements with large contributions to the negative
elements with large contributions. Cosines and
contributions for the punctuation example are
given in Tables 3 and 4.
Multiple Correspondence Analysis
CA works with a contingency table that is
equivalent to the analysis of two nominal vari-
ables (i.e., one for the rows and one for the col-
umns). Multiple CA (MCA) is an extension of
CA that analyzes the pattern of relationships
among several nominal variables. MCA is used
to analyze a set of observations described by
a set of nominal variables. Each nominal vari-
able comprises several levels, and each of these
levels is coded as a binary variable. For example,
gender (F vs. M) is a nominal variable with two
levels. The pattern for a male respondent will be
[0 1], and for a female respondent, [1 0]. The
complete data table is composed of binary col-
umns with one and only one column, per nomi-
nal variable, taking the value of 1.
MCA can also accommodate quantitative vari-
ables by recoding them as ‘‘bins.’’ For example,
a score with a range of − 5 to + 5 could be
recoded as a nominal variable with three levels:
less than 0, equal to 0, or more than 0. With this
schema, a value of 3 will be expressed by the pat-
tern 0 0 1. The coding schema of MCA implies
that each row has the same total, which for CA
implies that each row has the same mass.
Essentially, MCA is computed by using a CA
program on the data table. It can be shown that
the binary coding scheme used in MCA creates
artificial factors and therefore artificially reduces
the inertia explained. A solution for this problem
is to correct the eigenvalues obtained from the CA
program.
Herve´ Abdi and Lynne J. Williams
See also Barycentric Discriminant Analysis; Canonical
Correlation Analysis; Categorical Variable; Chi-Square
Test; Coefficient Alpha; Data Mining; Descriptive
Discriminant Analysis; Discriminant Analysis;
Exploratory Data Analysis; Exploratory Factor
Analysis; Guttman Scaling; Matrix Algebra; Principal
Components Analysis; R
Further Readings
Benze´cri, J. P. (1973). L’analyse des donne´es [Data
analysis] (2 vol.). Paris: Dunod.
Brunet, E. (1989). Faut-il ponderer les donne´es
linguistiques [Weighting linguistics data]. CUMFID,
16, 39–50.
Clausen, S. E. (1998). Applied correspondence analysis.
Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
Escofier, B., & Pages, J. (1998). Analyses factorielles
simples et multiples [Simple and multiple factor
analysis]. Paris: Dunod.
Greenacre, M. J. (1984). Theory and applications of
correspondence analysis. London: Academic Press.
Greenacre, M. J. (2007). Correspondence analysis in
practice (2nd ed.). Boca Raton, FL: Chapman & Hall/
CRC.
Greenacre, M. J., & Blasius, J. (Eds.). (2007). Multiple
correspondence analysis and related methods. Boca
Raton, FL: Chapman & Hall/CRC.
Hwang, H., Tomiuk, M. A., & Takane, Y. (2009).
Correspondence analysis, multiple correspondence
analysis and recent developments. In R. Millsap & A.
Maydeu-Olivares (Eds.), Handbook of quantitative
methods in psychology (pp. 243–263). London: Sage.
Lebart, L., & Fenelon, J. P. (1971). Statistiques et
informatique appliquees [Applied statistics and
computer science]. Paris: Dunod.
Weller, S. C., & Romney, A. K. (1990). Metric scaling:
Correspondence analysis. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
CORRESPONDENCE PRINCIPLE
The correspondence principle is generally known
as the Bohr correspondence principle (CP), for
Niels Bohr. It is considered one of Bohr’s greatest
contributions to physics, along with his derivation
of the Balmer formula. Bohr’s leading idea is that
classical physics, though limited in scope, is indis-
pensable for the understanding of quantum phys-
ics. The idea that old science is ‘‘indispensable’’ to
the understanding of new science is in fact the
main theme in using the concept of correspon-
dence; therefore, the CP can be defined as the prin-
ciple by which new theories of science (physics in
particular) can relate to previously accepted theo-
ries in the field by means of approximation at a cer-
tain limit. Historically, Max Planck had
introduced the concept in 1906. Bohr’s first han-
dling of the concept was in his first paper after
World War I, in which he showed that quantum
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formalism would lead to classical physics when
n→∞, where n is the quantum number. Although
there were many previous uses of the concept, the
important issue here is not to whom the concept
can be attributed, but an understanding of the var-
ious ways that it can be used in scientific and phil-
osophic research.
The principle is important for the continuity in
science. There are two ways of thinking about
such continuity. A theory T covers a set of obser-
vations S. A new observation s1 is detected. T can-
not explain s1. Scientists first try to adapt T to be
able to account for s1. But if T is not in principle
able to explain s1, then scientists will start to look
for another theory T * that can explain S and s1.
The scientist will try to derive T * by using CP as
a determining factor. In such a case, T * should
lead to T at a certain limit.
Nonetheless, sometimes there may be a set of
new observations, S1, for which it turns out that
a direct derivation of T* from T that might in prin-
ciple account for S1 is not possible or at least does
not seem to be possible. Then the scientist will try
to suggest T* separately from the accepted set of
boundary conditions and the observed set of S and
S1. But because T was able to explain the set of
observations S, then it is highly probable that T has
a certain limit of correct assumptions that led to its
ability to explain S. Therefore, any new theory T*
that would account for S and S1 should resemble T
at a certain limit. This can be obtained by specifying
a certain correspondence limit at which the new for-
malism of T* will lead to the old formalism of T.
These two ways of obtaining T * are the general
forms of applying the correspondence principle.
Nevertheless, the practice of science presents us
with many ways of connecting T * to T or parts of
it. Hence it is important to discuss the physicists’
different treatments of the CP. Moreover, the inter-
pretation of CP and the implications of using CP
will determine our picture of science and the future
development of science; hence, it is important to
discuss the philosophical implications of CP and
the different philosophical understandings of the
concept.
Formal Correspondence
In the current state of the relation between modern
physics and classical physics, there are four kinds
of formal correspondence between modern and
classical physics.
Old Correspondence Principle
(Numerical Correspondence)
Planck stressed the relation between his ‘‘radi-
cal’’ assumption of discrete energy levels that are
proportional to frequency, and the classical theory.
He insisted that the terms in the new equation
refer to the very same classical properties. He for-
mulated the CP so that the numerical value of
lim
h→ 0
½Quantumphysics= ½Classicalphysics
He demonstrated that the radiation law for the
energy density at frequency v,
uðvÞ= 8phv
3
c3ðehv=kT  1Þ, ð1Þ
corresponds numerically in the limit h→0 to the
classical Rayleigh–Jeans law:
uðvÞ= 8pkTv
2
c3
, ð2Þ
where k is Boltzmann’s constant, T is the tempera-
ture, and c is the speed of light. This kind of corre-
spondence entails that the new theory should
resemble the old one not just at the mathematical
level but also at the conceptual level.
Configuration Correspondence
Principle (Law Correspondence)
The configuration correspondence principle
claims that the laws of new theories should corre-
spond to the laws of the old theory. In the case of
quantum and classical physics, quantum laws corre-
spond to the classical laws when the probability den-
sity of the quantum state coincides with the classical
probability density. Take, for example, a harmonic
oscillator that has a classical probability density
PCðxÞ= 1=ðp ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃx2
0
x2
p
Þ, ð3Þ
where x is the displacement. Now if we superim-
pose the plot of this probability onto that of the
quantum probability density cnj j2 of the eigen-
states of the system and take (the quantum num-
ber) n→∞, we will obtain Figure 1 below. As
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Richard Liboff, a leading expert in the field, has
noted, the classical probability density PC does not
follow the quantum probability density cnj j2.
Instead, it follows the local average in the limit of
large quantum numbers n:
PCðxÞ= PQðxÞ
 = cnj j2E D= 12e Z
x+ e
xe
cnðyÞj j2dy:
ð4Þ
Frequency Correspondence Principle
The third type of correspondence is the offi-
cially accepted form of correspondence that is
known in quantum mechanics books as the Bohr
Correspondence Principle. This claims that the
classical results should emerge as a limiting case of
the quantum results in the limits n (the quantum
number) and h→0 (Planck’s constant). Then in
the case of frequency, the quantum value should
be equal to the classical value, i.e., Q= C. In
most cases in quantum mechanics, the quantum
frequency coalesces with the classical frequency in
the limit n→∞ and h→0.
Nevertheless, n→∞ and h→ 0. are not uni-
versally equivalent, because in some cases of the
quantum systems, the limit n→∞ does not
yield the classical one, while the limit h→ 0
does; the two results are not universally equiva-
lent. The case of a particle trapped in a cubical
box would be a good example: the frequency in
the high quantum number domain turns out to
be displaced as
vn+ 1q = vnq+ h=2md,
where m is the particle’s mass and d is the length
of the box. Such a spectrum does not collapse
toward the classical frequency in the limit of large
quantum numbers, while the spectrum of the parti-
cle does degenerate to the classical continuum in
the limit h→0 It can be argued that such corre-
spondence would face another obvious problem
relating to the assumption that Planck’s constant
goes to zero. What is the meaning of saying that
‘‘a constant goes to zero’’? A constant is a number
that has the same value at all times, and having it
as zero is contradictory, unless it is zero. A reply to
this problem might be that in correspondence, we
ought to take the real limiting value and not the
abstract one. In the case of relativity, the limit, ‘‘c
goes to infinity’’ is an abstract one, and the real
limit should be ‘‘v/c goes to zero.’’ Now, when
dealing with corresponding quantum mechanics to
classical mechanics, one might say that we ought
to take the limit n→∞ as a better one than h→ 0
The point here is that values like c and h are con-
stants and would not tend to go to zero or to infin-
ity, but n and n/c are variables—n = (0, 1, 2, 3, . .
. ) and n/c varies between 0 (when n= 0) and 1
(when nc). (Of course, this point can also count
against the old CP of Planck, the first correspon-
dence principle in our list, because it is built on the
assumption that the limit is of Planck’s constant
going to zero.)
Form Correspondence Principle
The last type of correspondence is form CP,
which claims that we can obtain correspondence if
the functional (mathematical) form of the new the-
ory is the same as that of the old theory. This kind
of correspondence is especially fruitful in particu-
lar cases in which other kinds of correspondence
do not apply. Let us take the example used in fre-
quency correspondence (quantum frequency). As
seen in the case of the particle in a cubical box, the
outcome of n→∞ does not coincide with the
outcome of h→0. Hence the two limits fail to
achieve the same result. In cases such as this, form
correspondence might overcome the difficulties
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facing frequency correspondence. The aim of form
correspondence is to prove that classical frequency
and quantum frequency have the same form. So, if
Q denotes quantum frequency, C classical fre-
quency, and E energy, then form correspondence is
satisfied if CðEÞ has the same functional form as
QðEÞ. Then, by using a dipole approximation,
Liboff showed that the quantum transition
between state s+ n and state s where s>> n gives
the relation
nQðEÞ≈ nðEs=2ma2Þ1=2: ð5Þ
He also noticed that if we treat the same system
classically (particles of energy E in a cubical box),
the calculation of the radiated power in the nth
vibrational mode is given by the expression
nCðEÞ≈ nðE=2ma2Þ1=2: ð6Þ
Both frequencies have the same form, even if
one is characterizing quantum frequency and the
other classical, and even if their experimental
treatment differs. Hence, form CP is satisfied.
But such correspondence is not problem free; in
the classical case, E denotes the average energy
value of an ensemble of nth harmonic frequency,
but in the quantum case, it denotes the eigenenergy
of that level. Also, in the quantum case, the energy
is discrete, and the only way to assert that the
quantum frequency yields the classical one is by
saying that when the quantum number is very big,
the number of points that coincide with the classi-
cal frequency will increase, using the dipole
approximation, which asserts that the distance
between the points in the quantum case is assumed
small. Hence the quantum case does not resemble
the classical case as such, but it coincides with the
average of an ensemble of classical cases.
The main thrust of form correspondence is that
it can relate a branch of physics to a different
branch on the basis of form resemblance, such as
in the case of superconductivity. Here, a quantum
formula corresponds to classical equations if we
can change the quantum formula in the limit into
a form where it looks similar to a classical form.
The case of Josephson junctions in superconductiv-
ity, which are an important factor in building
superconducting quantum interference devices,
presents a perfect demonstration of such concept.
Brian David Josephson proved that the relation
between the phase difference and the voltage is
given by {d{t= 2ehV, that is, the voltage V= h2e {d{t.
Now, by the assertion that the Josephson junction
would behave as a classical circuit, the total cur-
rent would be
I= Ic sin d+ Z2Re dddt+ ZC2e d
2d
dt2
: ð7Þ
This equation relates the current with the phase
difference but without any direct reference to the
voltage. Furthermore, if we apply form correspon-
dence, Equation 7 is analogous to the equation of
a pendulum in classical mechanics. The total tor-
que τ on the pendulum would be
τ=Md2y
dt2
+Ddy
dt
+ τ0 sin y, ð8Þ
where M is the moment of inertia, D is the viscous
damping, and τ is the applied torque.
Both these equations have the general mathe-
matical form
Y=Y0 sin xþ Bdx
dt
þ Ad
2x
dt2
: ð9Þ
This kind of correspondence can be widely used
to help in the solution of many problems in phys-
ics. Therefore, to find new horizons in physics,
some might even think of relating some of the new
theories that have not yet applied CP. Such is the
case with form corresponding quantum chaos to
classical chaos. The argument runs as follows:
Classical chaos exists. If quantum mechanics is to
be counted as a complete theory in describing
nature, then it ought to have a notion that corre-
sponds to classical chaos. That notion can be
called quantum chaos. But what are the possible
things that resemble chaotic behavior in quantum
systems? The reply gave rise to quantum chaos.
However, it turns out that a direct correspondence
between the notion of chaos in quantum mechan-
ics and that in classical mechanics does not exist.
Therefore, form correspondence would be fruit-
ful here. Instead of corresponding quantum chaos
to classical chaos, we can correspond both of them
to a third entity. Classical chaos goes in a certain
limit to the formj, and quantum chaos goes to the
same form at the same limit:
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Lim
n→∞
classicalchoas=j
Limn→∞ quantumchoas=j,
but because we have only classical and quantum
theories, then the correspondence is from one to
the other, as suggested by Gordon Belot and John
Earman.
In addition to these four formal forms of corre-
spondence, many other notions of correspondence
might apply, such as conceptual correspondence,
whereby new concepts ought to resemble old con-
cepts at the limited range of applicability of such
concepts. In addition, there is observational corre-
spondence, which is a weak case of correspon-
dence whereby the quantum will correspond to
what is expected to be observed classically at a cer-
tain limit. Structural correspondence combines ele-
ments from both form correspondence and law
correspondence. Hence, scientific practice might
need different kinds of correspondence to achieve
new relations and to relate certain domains of
applicability to other domains.
Philosophical Implications
Usually, principles in science, such as the Archi-
medes principle, are universally accepted. This is
not the case with CP. Although CP is considered
by most physicists to be a good heuristic device, it
is not accepted across the board. There are two
positions: The first thinks of development in sci-
ence as a mere trial-and-error process; the second
thinks that science is progressive and mirrors real-
ity, and therefore new theories cannot cast away
old, successful theories but merely limit the old
ones to certain boundaries.
Max Born, for example, believed that scientists
depend mainly on trial and error in a shattered
jungle, where they do not have any signposts in
science, and it is all up to them to discover new
roads in science. He advised scientists to rely not
on ‘‘abstract reason’’ but on experience. However,
to accept CP means that we accept abstract reason;
it also means that we do not depend on trial and
error but reason from whatever accepted knowl-
edge we have to arrive at new knowledge.
The philosophical front is much more complex.
There are as many positions regarding correspon-
dence as there are philosophers writing on the
subject. But in general, realists are the defenders of
the concept, whereas positivists, instrumentalists,
empiricists, and antirealists are, if not opposed to
the principle, then indifferent about it. Some might
accept it as a useful heuristic device, but that does
not give it any authoritarian power in science.
Even among realists there is more than one
position. Some such as Elie Zahar claim that the
CP influence ought to stem from old theory and
arrive at the new through derivative power.
Heinz Post is more flexible; he accepts both ways
as legitimate and suggests a generalized corre-
spondence principle that ought to be applied to
all the developments in science. In doing so, he is
replying to Thomas Kuhn’s Structure of Scientific
Revolutions, rejecting Kuhn’s claim of paradigm
shift and insisting on scientific continuity. In
doing so, Post is also rejecting Paul Feyerabend’s
concept of incommensurability.
So is CP really needed? Does correspondence
relate new theories to old ones, or are the new the-
ories deduced from old theories using CP? Can old
theories really be preserved? Or what, if anything,
can be preserved from the old theories? What about
incommensurability between the new and the old?
How can we look at correspondence in light of
Kuhn’s concept of scientific revolution? What hap-
pens when there is a paradigm shift? All these ques-
tions are in fact related to our interpretation of CP.
CP, realists say, would help us in understanding
developments in science as miracle free (the no-
miracle argument). Nevertheless, by accepting CP
as a principle that new theories should uphold, we
in effect are trapped within the scope of old theo-
ries. This means that if our original line of reason-
ing was wrong and still explains the set of
observations that we obtained, then the latter the-
ory that obeys CP will resolve the problems of the
old theory within a certain limit, will no doubt
continue to hold the posits of the wrong theory,
and will continue to abide by its accepted bound-
ary conditions. This means that we will not be able
to see where old science went wrong. In reply, con-
ventional realists and structural realists would
argue that the well-confirmed old theories are
good representations of nature, and hence any new
theories should resemble them at certain limits.
Well, this is the heart of the matter. Even if old the-
ories are confirmed by experimental evidence, this
is not enough to claim that the abstract theory is
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correct. Why? Mathematically speaking, if we
have any finite set of observations, then there are
many possible mathematical models that can
describe this set. Hence, how can we determine
that the model that was picked by the old science
was the right one?
But even if we accept CP as a heuristic device,
there are many ways that the concept can be
applied. Each of these ways has a different set of
problems for realists, and it is not possible to
accept any generalized form of correspondence.
The realist position was challenged by many phi-
losophers. Kuhn proved that during scientific revo-
lutions the new science adopts a new paradigm in
which the wordings of the old science might con-
tinue, but with different meanings. He demon-
strated such a change with mass: The concept of
mass in relativity is not the same as Newtonian
mass. Feyerabend asserted that the changes between
new science and old science make them incommen-
surable with each other. Hence, the realist notion of
approximating new theories to old ones is going
beyond the accepted limits of approximation.
The other major recent attacks on realism come
from pessimistic metainduction (Larry Laudan) on
one hand and new versions of empiricist arguments
(Bas van Fraassen) on the other. Van Fraassen
defines his position as constructive empiricism. Lau-
dan relies on the history of science to claim that the
realists’ explanation of the successes of science does
not hold. He argues that the success of theories can-
not offer grounds for accepting that these theories
are true (or even approximately true). He presents
a list of theories that have been successful and yet
are now acknowledged to be false. Hence, he con-
cludes, depending on our previous experience with
scientific revolutions, the only reasonable induction
would be that it is highly probable that our current
successful theories will turn out to be false. Van
Fraassen claims that despite the success of theories
in accounting for phenomena (their empirical ade-
quacy), there can never be any grounds for believ-
ing any claims beyond those about what is
observable. That is, we cannot say that such theo-
ries are real or that they represent nature; we can
only claim that they can account for the observed
phenomena.
Recent trends in realism tried to salvage realism
from these attacks, but most of these trends
depend on claiming that we do not need to save
the old theory as a whole; we can save only the
representative part. Structural realists, such as
John Worrell and Elie Zahar, claim that only the
mathematical structure need be saved and that CP
is capable of assisting us in saving it. Philip Kitcher
asserts that only presupposition posits can survive.
Towfic Shomar claims that the dichotomy should
be horizontal rather than vertical and that the only
parts that would survive are the phenomenological
models (phenomenological realism). Stathis Psillos
claims that scientific theories can be divided into
two parts, one consisting of the claims that con-
tributed to successes in science (working postu-
lates) and the other consisting of idle components.
Hans Radder, following Roy Bhaskar, thinks
that progress in science is like a production line:
There are inputs and outputs; hence our old
knowledge of theories and observations is the
input that dictates the output (our new theories).
CP is important in the process; it is a good heuris-
tic device, but it is not essential, and in many cases
it does not work.
But is CP a necessary claim for all kinds of real-
ism to account for developments in science? Some,
including Shomar, do not think so. Nancy Cart-
wright accepts that theories are mere tools; she
thinks that scientific theories are patchwork that
helps in constructing models that represent different
parts of nature. Some of these models depend on
tools borrowed from quantum mechanics and
account for phenomena related to the microscopic
world; others use tools from classical mechanics
and account for phenomena in the macroscopic
world. There is no need to account for any connec-
tion between these models. Phenomenological real-
ism, too, takes theories as merely tools to construct
phenomenological models that are capable of repre-
senting nature. In that case, whether the fundamen-
tal theories correspond to each other to some extent
or not is irrelevant. The correspondence of theories
concerns realists who think that fundamental theo-
ries represent nature and approximate its blueprint.
Currently, theoretical physics is facing a dead-
lock; as Lee Smolin and Peter Woit have argued,
the majority of theoretical physicists are running
after the unification of all forces and laws of phys-
ics. They are after the theory of everything. They
are convinced that science is converging toward
a final theory that represents the truth about
nature. They are in a way in agreement with the
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realists, who hold that successive theories of
‘‘mature science’’ approximate the truth more and
more, so science should be in quest of the final the-
ory of the final truth.
Theoretical representation might represent the
truth about nature, but we can easily imagine that
we have more than one theory to depend on.
Nature is complex, and in light of the richness of
nature, which is reflected in scientific practice, one
may be unable to accept that Albert Einstein’s
request for simplicity and beauty can give the cor-
rect picture of current science when complexity and
diversity appear to overshadow it. The complexity
of iphysics forces some toward a total disagreement
with Einstein’s dream of finding a unified theory for
everything. To some, such a dream directly contra-
dicts the accepted theoretical representations of
physics. Diversity and complexity are the main
characteristics of such representations.
Nonetheless, CP is an important heuristic device
that can help scientists arrive at new knowledge,
but scientists and philosophers should be careful
as to how much of CP they want to accept. As
long as they understand and accept that there is
more than one version of CP and as long as they
accept that not all new theories can, even in princi-
ple, revert to old theories at a certain point, then
they might benefit from applying CP. One other
remark of caution: Scientists and philosophers also
need to accept that old theories might be wrong;
the wrong mathematical form may have been
picked, and if they continue to accept such a form,
they will continue to uphold a false science.
Towfic Shomar
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COVARIATE
Similar to an independent variable, a covariate is
complementary to the dependent, or response, var-
iable. A variable is a covariate if it is related to the
dependent variable. According to this definition,
any variable that is measurable and considered to
have a statistical relationship with the dependent
variable would qualify as a potential covariate. A
covariate is thus a possible predictive or explana-
tory variable of the dependent variable. This may
be the reason that in regression analyses, indepen-
dent variables (i.e., the regressors) are sometimes
called covariates. Used in this context, covariates
are of primary interest. In most other circum-
stances, however, covariates are of no primary
interest compared with the independent variables.
They arise because the experimental or observa-
tional units are heterogeneous. When this occurs,
their existence is mostly a nuisance because they
may interact with the independent variables to
obscure the true relationship between the depen-
dent and the independent variables. It is in this cir-
cumstance that one needs to be aware of and
make efforts to control the effect of covariates.
Viewed in this context, covariates may be called
by other names, such as concomitant variables,
auxiliary variables, or secondary variables. This
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